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Chapter 2
Wage and Competition Channels
of Foreign Direct Investment and
New Firm Entry∗
* This chapter is joint work with Seçil Hülya Danakol and has been published in Small Business Economics.
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12 Chapter 2
2.1 Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has attracted considerable attention from scholars and
policy-makers alike and its size is seen as a key indicator of a country’s integration
into the world economy. This positive attitude towards FDI is based on the convic-
tion that it shifts resources to more efficient uses and disseminates best practices in
several domains. That is, the flow of capital, technology, knowledge and skills across
national boundaries is expected to create a multitude of opportunities in host coun-
tries (Caves (2007); Javorcik (2004); Kokko et al. (1996)). The early literature linking
FDI to local development predominantly addresses productivity effects on domestic
firms (Dunning and Lundan (2008)). The emphasis has recently shifted to a related
topic: the potential impact of FDI on domestic entrepreneurship. A handful of studies
exist (see, Barbosa and Eiriz (2009); De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003); Ayyagari and
Kosová (2010); Lee et al. (2014); Danakol et al. (2017)) that investigate the relationship
between FDI and entrepreneurship. However, the available empirical evidence is in-
conclusive on whether and how much FDI influences entrepreneurship. Moreover, the
existing literature fails to analyze the mechanisms behind the observed relationship.
This chapter is positioned to fill this gap in the literature.
FDI may affect new firm entry simultaneously through various channels. On the
one hand, foreign firms equipped with superior technology bring in technical exper-
tise to the host economies. Foreign-owned enterprises can act as external sources of
innovation and providers of tacit knowledge that can penetrate domestic firms and
entrepreneurs, paving the way for new firm creation. Knowledge may reach local en-
trepreneurs through labor mobility, demonstration, exports or training of suppliers.
Therefore, foreign firms, willingly or unwillingly, become involved in the birth of do-
mestic businesses (Görg and Strobl (2002); Barrios et al. (2005)). On the other hand,
a large foreign presence can also coincide with the crowding-out of domestic enter-
prises, for example, due to intensified competition in product markets (De Backer and
Sleuwaegen (2003)). Likewise, by paying higher wages, foreign-owned enterprises
may increase the incentives for wage-employment as opposed to entrepreneurship
thereby making new firm creation less attractive. An increase in FDI presence could
536891-L-sub01-bw-Marzieh
Processed on: 15-10-2019 PDF page: 31
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also lead to higher barriers to entry, thereby constraining new firm creation (Danakol
et al. (2017)).
Specifically, this study focuses on two prominent channels ––industry competition
and wage levels through which FDI can potentially affect entrepreneurial activities.
We propose that FDI is indirectly related to new firm creation through a direct effect on
the levels of competition1 and wages, which, in turn, reflects the rates of entrepreneur-
ship. With regard to industry competition, the first channel, several advantages (i.e.,
advanced technology, product differentiation, scale economies, organizational capa-
bilities) enable foreign firms to enter and expand quickly in local markets, altering
competition between incumbents. Previous studies confirm that the degree of compe-
tition is a key factor in determining the rates of firm entry, although the direction of
this effect is not always clear-cut (Geroski (1995)), and warrants additional empirical
verification.
Regarding wage levels, the second channel, several papers have concluded that
foreign firms often pay higher wages even after controlling for the quality of the work-
force (Görg and Greenaway (2004)). This may be due to, for example, having lim-
ited knowledge of the local labor market, or incentives to prevent information leakage
which could strengthen the position of local rivals. Furthermore, by attracting inno-
vative human capital, foreign firms may reduce local labor supply, increasing wages
across the whole industry. A larger foreign presence in host country industries is usu-
ally associated with higher wages (Chen et al. (2011)). If higher wages motivate po-
tential entrepreneurs to choose wage-employment more often, the whole industry will
experience lower domestic new firm entry.
Our study empirically investigates the role of FDI in explaining the rates of new
firm formation through its effects on competition and wage levels in manufacturing
industries in the Netherlands. We use firm-level panel data from CBS (Centraal Bu-
reau voor de Statistiek/Statistics Netherlands) that is aggregated to the 5-digit NACE
1 The assumption maintained throughout this chapter is that lower (higher) industry concentration is re-
garded as proxying more (less) competition. This is a widely used approach in relevant studies. For the
theoretical foundation of our choice, please see Appendix A.
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rev. 1.1 industry level. Our sample is an unbalanced panel comprising 3784 industry-
year observations of 252 industries over the 1995-2010 period. To evaluate whether
FDI is directly and/or indirectly related to domestic firm entry via the wage and com-
petition channels, we formulate a system of three structural equations. We estimate
these simultaneous equations by using three-stage least square (3SLS). This technique
allows entry rates, competition and wage levels to be determined concurrently within
the system.
We derive four main results from the analysis where domestic entrepreneurship is
measured as the rate of gross new firm entry at the 5-digit NACE level. Specifically,
entry rates:
1. are negatively associated with wage levels which are found to be higher in in-
dustries with increased FDI: a 10% increase in wages due to FDI coincides with
a decrease of 3.6% in entry rates.
2. are positively associated with the degree of concentration which is also higher in
industries with larger FDI: a 10% increase in concentration due to FDI coincides
with an increase of 4.4% in entry rates.
3. are negatively associated with FDI once the effects via wage and concentration
channels are isolated: a 10 percentage point increase in FDI reduces entry rates
by 0.4 percentage points, or nearly 6% of the average entry rate.
4. Finally, the total effect of FDI (direct effect and effects via channels are combined)
is negative, but small and negligible after one year.
To check for robustness, we replicate the analysis using a sample excluding one-
(wo)man businesses. We observe no major deviations from our original results. Fur-
thermore, we distinguish between high- and low-tech industries. We found strik-
ing differences in the way FDI affects gross entry rates across these two subsamples.
Specifically, the negative effect of FDI on domestic entrepreneurship features strongly
in low-tech industries but not in high-tech sectors.
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This study contributes to the emerging research stream on the nexus between FDI
and domestic firm entry in several ways. To begin with, our study is the first to pro-
vide empirical evidence on this issue in the Dutch context. Despite its small size, the
Netherlands attracts sizable FDI inflows. The corresponding figure was approximately
$US 154 billion in 2016, which is equivalent to 19.8% of its GDP (data from the World
Bank). Such a large share of FDI requires continuous monitoring and evaluation of its
potential benefits and risks by policy-makers. Our results are of high relevance in this
regard. It is also valuable to consider the Dutch context since the country is a mem-
ber of the European Union (EU), where increased integration of national practices is
a shared goal for all involved. The unification of policies also encompasses issues re-
lated to entrepreneurship and FDI, suggesting that the member states tend to become
more homogeneous in the respective domains over time. Therefore, despite the single
country approach, the analysis of the Dutch case has relevance for other countries in
the union, particularly for its core members. In relation to the available evidence, the
study by De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003) comes closest to our work both in terms
of country similarity and reported results. Drawing on firm-level data from Belgium,
also a small open economy, this paper reveals a crowding-out effect of FDI on entry
rates in the manufacturing sectors over the period 1990-1995.
Second, the use of a simultaneous equations model is novel to this particular do-
main. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to employ a multi-equation frame-
work to capture the channels running from FDI to firm entry. This approach has been
used in other contexts. For example, Wacziarg (2001) specifies a simultaneous equa-
tions model to investigate the impact of trade policy on economic growth transmitted
through six channels, while Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) evaluate the relationship be-
tween democracy and growth via the same approach. We propose this methodology
because of its suitability for the analysis of interdependent relationships inherent in the
FDI-entry link. In this way, it is hoped that more informative and reliable conclusions
can be drawn. Furthermore, our setup treats the level of industry concentration and
wages as endogenous variables, which are often taken as given in previous studies.
The concurrent pursuit of these two channels allows us to gauge their relative impor-
tance in explaining new firm formation and complements the theoretical treatments
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by Markusen and Venables (1999) and Grossman (1984).
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the theoretical
under-pinnings of how FDI is related to domestic firm entry through industry com-
petition and wage levels. Arguments on the direct FDI-entry link are also considered.
We also develop our hypotheses in this section. Next, section 2.3 presents the data and
the estimation method. Section 2.4 discusses the empirical results. Finally, section 2.5
concludes with a discussion of our main results, the limitations of our research, and its
implications for theory and practice as well as avenues for future research.
2.2 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
As discussed in the previous section, FDI may be simultaneously linked to new firm
creation directly and/or via the wage and competition channels. This section explores
relevant studies on the relationship between FDI on the one hand, and firm entry,
industry competition and wages on the other. Moreover, we develop three main hy-
potheses regarding these associations in the following subsections.
2.2.1 Competition Effects of FDI and New Firm Entry
FDI and Industry Competition From a theoretical point of view, the literature pro-
poses two competing arguments regarding the impact of FDI on market structure in
host countries. The first one posits that FDI reduces the level of industry concentration
and increases competition. The intuition is that foreign entry takes place in response
to market failures so that industries where market imperfections are prevalent attract
higher volumes of FDI (Caves (2007)). Dunning and Lundan (2008) classify market im-
perfections into two categories: those peculiar to the industry in question such as scale
economies, and those that are caused by the distorting behavior of regulators and firms
such as government-imposed rigidities and predatory pricing. Being exposed to multi-
ple market environments, foreign firms have a distinct advantage in overcoming these
entry barriers and other imperfections which curb the number of firms in some indus-
tries (Geroski (1991a)). Their advantages derive, among others, from superior produc-
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tion technology, knowledge of new products, organizational and marketing capabil-
ities (Teece (1985)). From this perspective, foreign firms are the most likely entrants
in industries where domestic firms have a limited capacity to enter (Gorecki (1976)).
Hence, FDI is expected to decrease industry concentration (Caves (2007)). Likewise,
as outlined by Driffield (2001a), domestic industries face competitive pressures from
the influx of FDI and subsequently the market shares of the leading host country firms
are reduced. Blomström and Kokko (1999) and Teece (2006) argue that foreign firms
increase competition, as their entry and operational strategies disrupt established re-
lationships between incumbent domestic firms and force incumbents to become more
efficient.
The second argument runs counter to these views and poses that FDI raises the
level of industry concentration and reduces competition. According to Hymer (1976)
and Kindleberger (1969), firms expand abroad to remove competition through exploit-
ing Bain-type monopolistic advantages. These advantages are exclusive to the firm
owning them and pertain to the realms of innovatory, cost, financial or marketing ca-
pabilities (Dunning and Lundan (2008)). Put differently, FDI is used as an effective
instrument to restrain competition and to augment market power via the unique com-
bination of skills and assets transferred abroad. Likewise, Casson (1986) argues that
foreign investors are increasingly lured by host countries because of the possibilities
for above-normal profits in concentrated industries. Indeed, explanations of FDI based
on ownership advantages place an emphasis on the idea that firms undertake invest-
ment abroad in order to earn above-normal profits through the exploitation of their
competitive advantages. Foreign firms tend to be better placed than their weak do-
mestic counterparts to extract rents. Faced with superior efficiency and aggressive
business conduct, domestic firms may not withstand disruptive shocks and be forced
out of business, resulting in an increase in industry concentration (Aitken and Har-
rison (1999)). Forte (2016) argues that anti-competitive effects are foreseeable because
foreign firms, which are larger in size, create their own barriers for further competition
by increasing the industry’s minimum efficient scale.
Both of these conflicting views are plausible but we anticipate that the pro-competitive
536891-L-sub01-bw-Marzieh
Processed on: 15-10-2019 PDF page: 36
18 Chapter 2
effect prevails in our analysis of the Dutch case. Domestic firms in developed economies
may already possess the technology that foreign firms bring, and are therefore able to
compete more vigorously with them (OECD (2002)), dissipating any excess profits.
The Netherlands attracts FDI predominantly from advanced economies so that tech-
nological proximity between Dutch and foreign firms is expected to be high. As Amess
and Roberts (2005) and Lall (1979) argue, when differences in technological and orga-
nizational capabilities are small, FDI is likely to be pro-competitive and to reduce in-
dustry concentration. Driffield (2001a,0) reports results in line with this prediction and
concludes that the presence of FDI in the manufacturing industries in the UK reduces
the concentration ratio. Furthermore, in the Netherlands firmly enforced and credible
antitrust laws are in place to prohibit anti-competitive behavior of foreign firms.
This study does not consider the entry mode of FDI since our firm-level investment
data does not permit us to differentiate between greenfield and mergers and acquisi-
tions (M&A). Yet, the aggregate figures indicate that the majority of FDI in the Nether-
lands takes the form of M&A (Hogenbirk (2009)). At the outset, M&A involves the
transfer of ownership rights rather than new local production capacity. Accordingly,
one could argue that FDI in this context is more likely to increase industry concentra-
tion as opposed to what is suggested. We are of the opinion that such reasoning is espe-
cially pertinent to M&A taking place between domestic firms. In contrast, cross-border
M&A can contribute to a more pro-competitive environment by acting as the vanguard
of new foreign entrants in the domestic economy. Furthermore, M&A prevents con-
centration levels from rising by preserving local firms which otherwise would cease
operating. As UNCTAD (2000) puts forward, in the long run, the independent effects
of greenfield and M&A investment on host countries in various domains, including
industry concentration, are indistinguishable. For example, following cross-border
M&A, foreign acquires often expand domestic operations through subsequent invest-
ments. FDI via the M&A route tends to contribute to the production capacity just as
greenfield FDI does, but this impact materializes over a longer time horizon. Given
the 15-year coverage of our data, we have sufficient confidence that our analysis cap-
tures this conceptualization, and provides justification for the pro-competitive effects
of FDI. In line with this reasoning, we formulate the following sub-hypothesis:
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H1a: The greater the FDI in an industry, the lower (higher) the industry concentra-
tion (competition).
Industry Competition and New Firm Entry Since Orr (1974)’s prominent article on
the determinants of new firm entry, there have been many studies evaluating how in-
dustry concentration affects entry. The most prominent view is that high concentration
acts as a deterrent (Siegfried and Evans (1994)). In industries characterized by high
concentration, new entrants may pose an immediate threat to the customer base of es-
tablished firms and are expected to erode their market share. Hence, powerful incum-
bents often have incentives to drive them out of business before newcomers establish
themselves and secure their survival (Shane (2003)). Put differently, high concentration
facilitates collusion and predatory behavior among firms to discourage entry. The ten-
dency of incumbents to respond aggressively is most pronounced when their profits
are strategically interdependent (Oster (1999)). Alternative conducts include, among
others, predatory pricing, hostile takeovers, heavy advertising outlays and preemptive
capacity expansion. Monitoring strategic characteristics of established firms, would-
be entrepreneurs infer such predatory intents and take them into account in their entry
decisions. Nevertheless, in cases where domestic and foreign firms share similarities
in technological and organizational capabilities, the former may take a stronger stance
against undesirable practices. The innovative capacity of new entrants enables them
to overcome various challenges imposed and characterized by FDI. Driven by excess
profit opportunities, they can enter and expand more easily in concentrated industries
along with foreign firms. These arguments suggest the following sub-hypothesis:
H1b: The greater the reduction in industry concentration due to FDI, the greater
the entry rate in the same industry.
2.2.2 Wage Effects of FDI and New Firm Entry
FDI and Industry Wages A vast literature is devoted to the consequences of foreign
presence on local labor market conditions (Görg and Greenaway (2004)). Of particular
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interest to this study are the effects of FDI on wage levels.
First, increased wages in host countries can be attributed to productivity growth
induced by foreign firms. For instance, access to foreign knowledge may foster hu-
man capital formation and bring productivity gains to domestic firms. Learning from
foreign firms is viewed as a central vehicle of technology transfer. Provided that tech-
nology introduced by foreign firms is internalized by the domestic labor force and
knowledge spreads to local enterprises, domestic employees may become more pro-
ductive over time (Aitken et al. (1996)). This allows local companies to reduce ineffi-
ciencies, leading to productivity growth and higher productivity raises wage rates in
the domestic economy (Driffield and Taylor (2000)).
Second, foreign firms might also create upward pressure on wages simply by rais-
ing demand for labor (Das (2002)). Hence, FDI-induced competition in labor markets
can force domestic firms to increase wages with the aim of attracting a better quali-
fied workforce. However, concerns have been expressed that foreign firms and their
domestic counterparts may simply operate in different labor markets. That is, factor
demand of firms may substantially differ. For example, foreign firms may prefer to
hire a highly skilled workforce, because technology accompanying FDI is expected to
be complementary to skilled labor (Görg and Greenaway (2004)). An increase in for-
eign capital would then increase demand and wages for highly skilled labor.
The drawbacks of such segmentation in labor markets include less scope for posi-
tive effects on wages as the mobility of skilled labor towards domestic firms would
be limited. Furthermore, by poaching the more productive workers, foreign firms
may lower both the quality of labor and wage rates in domestic firms (Driffield and
Girma (2003)). Besides positive wage spillovers, higher wages in host countries may
also reflect the fact that foreign firms generally pay higher wages than their domes-
tic counterparts both in developed and developing countries (Almeida (2007); Görg
and Greenaway (2004); Heyman et al. (2007)). This observation is attributed to their
larger size together with being more capital and skill intensive. In fact, productivity
advantages stemming from these properties tend to be a source of wage differentials.
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For example, Conyon et al. (2002) find a wage differential of 3.4% across foreign and
domestically-owned firms in the UK manufacturing industries caused solely by pro-
ductivity. There are other plausible reasons why foreign firms pay a higher price for
labor.
Offering wage premiums might be necessary to attract qualified workers when
knowledge of local market conditions is inadequate. Incentives to reduce labor turnover
can also motivate foreign firms to offer higher wages. This would be important for for-
eign firms if they want to minimize the risk of leakage of proprietary knowledge, or of
employee skills augmented through training (Fosfuri et al. (2001)). Moreover, the local
labor force may have a preference for employment in domestic enterprises if jobs else-
where are viewed as less secure. Wage premiums may act as a response to this home
bias in choosing a preferred employer. Finally, internal fairness policies within foreign
firms may aim at reducing wage gaps between employees across different locations,
thus motivating higher wages.2
H2a: The greater the FDI in an industry, the higher the industry wage level.
Industry Wages and New Firm Entry From the above discussion, it is evident that
wages in host countries can in part be explained by the existence of foreign firms.
The combination of higher wages in foreign firms and positive wage spillovers to do-
mestic firms leads to higher overall wages. This will have implications for domestic
entrepreneurship.
Potential entrepreneurs represent an untapped resource for the development of na-
tional economies. When a market opportunity is recognized, entrepreneurs face an oc-
cupational choice. They tend to compare waged employment at an established firm to
the potential profits from venture creation (Roy (1951); Parker (2009)). Entrepreneurial
ideas are exploited, provided that accompanying benefits outnumber alternatives. By
increasing overall wage rates and offering wage premiums in host countries, foreign
firms may influence the trade-off between wage employment and entrepreneurship
2 See Lipsey (2004) for a summary of the literature on FDI and wages.
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in favor of the former. Prospective entrepreneurs would be hired by foreign-owned
firms that offer higher wages and promising career opportunities. Entrepreneurs with
expertise in various domains may be especially complementary to the advanced tech-
nologies introduced by foreign firms. Thus, recruiting entrepreneurially-talented in-
dividuals can bring numerous advantages to foreign firms, which are compensated
with an attractive wage. As this gives rise to a smaller pool of future entrepreneurs
(De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003); Grossman (1984); Lee et al. (2014)), FDI may re-
strict new firm creation in host countries. In line with this reasoning, we hypothesize
that:
H2b: The greater the increase in industry wages due to FDI, the lower the entry
rate in the same industry.
2.2.3 Direct Effects of FDI on New Firm Entry
Undoubtedly, there are other mechanisms through which FDI may affect domestic firm
entry. Our empirical setting, however, does not allow us to separate and quantify the
independent effect of specific factors. Therefore, in what follows we briefly review the
main insights that are relevant to our context and formulate the hypothesis account-
ing for the totality of the relations other than those identified above. This is termed as
‘the direct effect’ of FDI to distinguish it from the effects of industry concentration and
wage channels on entry.
Theory suggests that the remaining FDI effects can be both positive and negative
and we start with the former. First, domestic entrepreneurs can improve their chances
of establishing successful businesses by observing and imitating products, technolo-
gies and organizational practices of foreign firms. This mechanism is known as the
demonstration effect (Görg and Strobl (2001); Barry et al. (2003)). As new products
are already accepted in the marketplace, entrepreneurs may discern their commercial
viability and convert them into profitable businesses with low failure risk. The ex-
tent of benefits depends on the sophistication of technology, with complex products
and processes requiring specialized labor and skills are hard to imitate through ob-
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servation. In contrast, organizational innovations are easier to replicate by would-be
entrepreneurs (Görg and Greenaway (2004)). Second, FDI may enrich the local knowl-
edge base through the physical migration of workers. Foreign firms dedicate substan-
tial resources to training and education to improve the capacity of their workforce,
encouraging creativity and innovation. Equipped with a unique set of skills, people
previously employed in foreign firms may start their own businesses. Furthermore,
they may view priorities and strategies of foreign firms as the benchmark from which
to learn and emulate in their founding and early growth stages (Barbosa and Eiriz
(2009)).
Third, export-oriented FDI may assist host country firms in reaching markets be-
yond their national borders (Aitken et al. (1997)). For example, domestic firms may
be created when overseas market opportunities are detected through the exploitation
of foreign firms’ distribution channels and knowledge of consumer preferences. En-
trepreneurs can arrange such exclusive transactions through informal social networks
and joint memberships in business associations (Greenaway et al. (2004)).
Increased foreign presence may also exert a downward influence on entry. To begin
with, entrepreneurship requires a variety of resources including capital, appropriate
infrastructure, technological know-how and alike. These are utilized both during the
establishment and subsequent expansion period. FDI into a country alters the balance
of resources and often shifts them away from would-be entrepreneurs. As such, for-
eign firms may bid up factor prices raising the cost of new firm entry and affecting
the subsequent earnings potential. The shortage of affordable resources changes the
motives of domestic entrepreneurs in relation to owning a business (Parker (2009)).
Fewer individuals may opt for entrepreneurship where the initial cost requirements
are higher and the required resources are of great variety. Second, foreign firms are of-
ten eligible for various schemes such as export incentive programs and tax allowances
which can result in high entry barriers in certain industries, constraining new firm
formation (Aitken and Harrison (1999); Haddad and Harrison (1993)). Furthermore,
industries are heterogeneous in many of their characteristics including innovation pat-
terns and technological levels. In turn, these discrepancies are likely to affect the way
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entrepreneurship rates react to FDI presence in the respective industries. While high-
tech sectors may be at an advantage due to their greater innovative capacity, low-tech
sectors are more prone to the negative effects imposed by FDI (Görg and Strobl. (2000)).
In the Netherlands, the workforce is characterized by high productivity and edu-
cational attainment with a strong international orientation (Hogenbirk (2009)). Such
a capacity is not only complementary to the advanced technologies embodied in FDI,
but also enables individuals to exploit new knowledge and turn it into entrepreneurial
ideas. Drawing on these arguments, we propose the following hypothesis:
H3: The greater the FDI in an industry, the greater the positive direct effect on firm
entry.
2.3 Data and Methodology
2.3.1 Data Sources
Firm-level data used in this study is made available by CBS (Centraal Bureau voor de
Statistiek/ Statistics Netherlands) via several data bases. Each firm in our sample had
a unique identification number which enabled us to link all data sources discussed
below into a single file. All surveys are collected annually. In order to build the data
set, we started with the Business Register (ABR), which incorporates the whole popu-
lation of firms and reports annual statistics including the number of employees as well
as the industry code a firm belonged to and its location. From this database we also
extracted information whether a firm is newly formed or already existing. We focus
on manufacturing as it has the most detailed data available and also the longest time
period.
We merged the Business Register with Production Statistics (PS-Industry), which
consist of information about wages, turnover, research and development expenses,
advertising as well as training costs of firms. For the FDI variable, we used the Finan-
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cial Statistics of Large Enterprises (SFGO)3 which provide data on the percentage of a
firm’s equity owned by foreign investors. SFGO incorporates firms with a total asset
of at least e 22.7M. We use SFGO to identify the presence of FDI per firm and industry.
From SFGO, together with its equivalent for small firms SFKO4 and NFO5, we also
obtained more information on wages, capital stocks and number of employees as well.
Our FDI measure is therefore limited to investments into firms with assets of at least
e 22.7M, which account for the large majority of foreign investment.
Data on age structure and gender composition of workforce come from the Munici-
pal Personal Records Database (GBA).6 Finally, the skill level of the labor force is made
available via the source Educational Level (HOOGSTEOPLTAB) which utilizes the In-
ternational Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) maintained by the United
Nations. In order to link person information to the respective firm, we had to use two
other surveys: BAANKENMERKENBUS and BAANSOMMENTAB. Observations at
the firm level are then aggregated at the industry level based on the NACE rev. 1.1
classification at the 5-digit (SBI 5 digit level)7 of manufacturing industries.
The final sample is an unbalanced panel covering the years between 1995 and 2010
and comprising 37848 industry-year observations that span 252 industries, over a 15-
year period. Appendix B describes definitions and sources of our variables in more
detail.
2.3.2 Variables
We define Entryit as the gross entry rate of indigenous firms, which is calculated as the
number of domestic firm entries at time t divided by the total number of firms in the
3 Statistiek financiën van grote (niet-financiële) ondernemingen in Dutch.
4 Statistiek financiën kleine ondernemingen in Dutch.
5 As of 2000, SFGO and SFKO merged into a single data set; the so-called statistics on finances of non-
financial enterprises (NFO-statistiek financiën van niet-financiële ondernemingen in Dutch). However,
SFGO as such is still available.
6 Gemeentelijke basisadministratie persoonsgegevens in Dutch.
7 SBI stands for ‘standaard bedrijfsindeling’ which corresponds to the Dutch version of the NACE industry
classification.
8 This value is based on Model 1 in Table 2.3 where no lag structure is imposed. Alternative models with
different lag lengths and the breakdown of industries based on technological intensity culminate in different
number of observations.
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While some studies such as Markusen and Venables (1999) use changes in the total
number of firms (net entry), most studies of entry employ the gross entry rate (e.g. Acs
and Audretsch (1989) and Mata (1993)) because the latter is not confounded by deter-
minants that only affect firm exit. ln(Wageit) is defined as the natural logarithm of the
average wage per employee. The average wage is calculated as the total wage expen-






The Herfindahl Index (HHI) is a proxy for concentration and computed as the sum
of the squares of the market shares of all firms in industry i at time t. We use turnover
(sales) to quantify market shares and hence HHIit:
HHIit = ∑j∈i{ (Turnoverjt)∑j∈i(Turnoverjt)}
2
To avoid possible aggregation bias, we compute FDIit as employment in foreign-
owned firms weighted by firms’ foreign equity participation divided by total employ-
ment in industry i at time t.




We define the minimum efficient scale as the average firm size in terms of employ-
ment in industry i at time t which serves as a proxy for barriers to entry in the sector. A
high MESit may deter new firm formation due to, for example, higher capital require-




Growthit refers to the industry annual employment growth rate. A growing market
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offers a higher probability of survival for start up firms and hence, more firms may
enter the market (Mata and Machado (1996)).
Growthit = Laborit − Laborit−1
Note that we use the number of employees to weight FDI and to define MES and
Growth since labor is the only proxy for firm size with complete information in our
data. Furthermore, we define Capitalit as the capital labor ratio: industry capital stock




Similarly, the variable Trainingit is training cost per employee per industry. ln(R&Dit)
and ln(Advertisementit) are respectively the natural logarithms of research and devel-
opment expenditures and advertising expenditures per industry. Femaleit is the pro-
portion of female workers and Skillit is the share of employees who have a college
degree in industry i. This variable serves as a proxy for highly-skilled workers. Ageit
is the average age of the workforce in industry i. To control for spatial heterogene-
ity we introduce the variable Regionit, which is defined as the proportion of firms in
industry i located in one of the following provinces: North Holland, South Holland
or North Brabant. We either take the natural logarithm of the variables or winsorize
them.
2.3.3 Methodology
To analyze whether FDI presence in Dutch manufacturing industries is directly or indi-
rectly related to domestic new firm creation via the wage and/or competition channels
we formulate a system of three equations. We estimate these simultaneous equations
using three stage least squares (3SLS). This system considers, on the one hand, the ef-
fect of FDI on new firm entry, wages, and market concentration, while, on the other
hand, it takes into account that wages and concentration may also have an indirect ef-
fect on new firm creation: In particular, for each industry i and year t, let Entryit denote
the rate of domestic gross entry, Wageit average industry wages and HHIit industry
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concentration. Hence the system of equations is as follows:
Entryit = α1Wageit + γ1HHIit + θ1FDIit + β1X1 + τt + ιi + ε1 (2.1)
Wageit = θ2FDIit + β2X2 + τt + ιi + ε2 (2.2)
HHIit = θ3FDIit + β3X3 + τt + ιi + ε3 (2.3)
where FDIit is the share of industry employment in foreign firms, and where X1, X2,
X3 represent matrices with industry-year specific control variables. X1 and X3 are the
matrices of explanatory variables Growthit, MESit, Capitalit, R&Dit, Advertisementit,
Regionit and X2 is the matrix of explanatory variables MESit, Capitalit, Ageit, Femaleit,
Trainingit, Skillit and Regionit. Finally, ιi are added to each model to account for unob-
served industry-specific time-invariant effects. Likewise τt are incorporated to capture
unobserved time-varying effects. ε1 , ε2 and ε3 are disturbance terms.
The inclusion of the above control variables in each of the three specifications is in
line with earlier studies on firm entry, market concentration and wage rates (e.g. Görg
and Strobl (2002); Mata (1993); Görg and Greenaway (2004)). We start with X1 in equa-
tion (1). Entry into industries with higher growth potential is often found to be easier.
Therefore, we expect a positive association between gross entry rates and the variable
Growth (Görg and Strobl (2002); Mata and Machado (1996)). On the other hand, MES,
Capital and Advertisement may serve as entry barriers for new firms with higher val-
ues indicating higher barriers to entry. Given this reasoning, a negative relationship
between these measures and gross entry is plausible.
Potential effects of R&D on entry are unclear. On the one hand, the rates of new
firm entry can be larger when there is a relatively high level of technological oppor-
tunity or R&D intensity. On the other hand, high R&D expenditures may act as an
entry deterrent. The use of these variables is prevalent in the literature and has proven
important in explaining firm entry rate (e.g., Acs and Audretsch (1989); Barrios et al.
(2005); Geroski (1995); Mata (1993)).
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With regard to the wage specification and control variables of X2 in equation (2),
the literature suggests that capital intensive industries have a higher marginal product
of labor, and thus pay higher wage rates (Görg and Greenaway (2004)). Likewise, in in-
dustries where the average skill level is higher, the workforce is paid higher wages due
to the skill premium (Lipsey and SjÃu˝holm (2004)). Given this evidence, it is plausible
to anticipate a positive link between wages and the variables Capital and Skill. Fur-
thermore, previous studies point to significant female-male wage differentials where
women are often paid less than men (Aitken et al. (1996)). Finally, we expect Age and
Training to influence average industry wages positively as the labor force acquires ad-
ditional skills through experience and on-the-job training (Zhao (2001)).
With respect to the determinants of industry concentration and control variables of
X3 in equation (3), we expect Growth to have a negative association with HHI as, with
all being equal, growing industries accommodate more new firms. MES, Capital and
Advertisement are control variables reflecting entry barriers. As higher barriers impede
new firm creation, we expect a positive relationship between industry concentration
and these measures. Furthermore, if larger R&D expands the range of opportunities
for new entry, such practices would diminish market concentration. In contrast, if it
acts as an entry barrier, concentration rates tend to rise with increases in R&D. The im-
portance of these variables in determining industry concentration is widely discussed
in the literature (Blomström (1986); Driffield (2001a); Forte (2016)), which is why we
include them in our empirical specification.
To determine the total effect of FDI on entry rates (direct effect plus effects via chan-
nels), we take the partial derivative of the system of equations presented above with
respect to FDI:
δY1





= θ1 + α1θ2 + γ1θ3
Furthermore, we estimate the system of equations (1) to (3) by adding lagged FDI
(FDIt−1 and FDIt−2) into the regression. This allows varying amounts of recent his-
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tory to be brought into the estimation model in order to capture possible effect of FDI
on entry during period t using knowledge of what happened during t− 1 and t− 2.
Our analysis applies the method of Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) and Wacziarg
(2001) to the entrepreneurship literature in connection with FDI, and we estimate entry,
wage and concentration equations simultaneously by using 3SLS. This technique al-
lows entry rates, wage and concentration levels to be determined concurrently within
the system. Introduced by Zellner and Theil (1962), 3SLS is a full-information ap-
proach because it makes use of knowledge of all the restrictions in the system of struc-
tural equations when estimating the parameters. Put differently, it allows for contem-
poraneous correlation in the disturbances across equations. We applied the Breusch-
Pagan test of independence to assess whether the cross-equation error covariance ex-
ists in the data (Greene (2011)), and confirmed the need for the simultaneous estima-
tion approach.9 By deriving a single covariance matrix for the error terms through joint
estimation, 3SLS lead to efficiency gains compared to the estimation of each equation
independently. Moreover, the Hausman specification test verified that the system of
structural equations is properly specified.
The joint estimation of entry, concentration and wage specifications points to en-
dogeneity concerns as ln(WAGE) and HHI appear on the right-hand-side of equation
(1). 3SLS yields consistency but this necessitates appropriate instrumenting for each
endogenous variable in our system. The first-stage of 3SLS deals with this challenge
where endogenous measures are regressed on all exogenous variables to obtain their
fitted values used as valid instruments. The second-stage involves estimating each
specification in the system separately via 2SLS utilizing the instruments derived in the
first-stage. This enables the construction of the covariance matrix for the disturbances
of the system of structural equations. Finally, in the third-stage, both the estimated
covariance matrix from the second-stage and the predicted values of the endogenous
variables retrieved in the first-stage are used to perform the generalized-least squares
estimation.
9 All unreported results are available from the authors on request.
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2.3.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 provides some descriptive statistics. We see that the gross entry rate in Dutch
manufacturing industries is about 7.4% on average over the sample period. Further-
more, foreign firms account for 16% of industry employment on average with the low-
est and highest values observed at 0% to 100%. This suggests that while certain indus-
tries fail to attract FDI inflows, some other sectors are entirely dominated by foreign
firms. Moreover, Dutch manufacturing industries, on average, have 4973 employees
with an average age of 39, of which approximately 25% are female and 30% are highly
skilled over the sample period. Employees, on average, receive e 38,000 per year.
While in the US, an industry is considered as moderately concentrated if its HHI
index falls between 0.15 and 0.25, a value in excess of 0.25 points out high market con-
centration.10 In contrast, the EU prefers to focus on the change rather than the absolute
level of the HHI index to conclude whether an industry is concentrated or not. With an
average HHI value of 0.32, Dutch manufacturing industries proved to be highly con-
centrated according to the US standard. However, the same concentration ratio does
not convey much information within the realms of the EU competition legislation as
the average HHI in Table 2.1 refers to the level rather than the change in the concen-
tration index.
Table 2.1. Summary Statistics
Variable Description Mean Std. Min Max
Entryit Domestic gross entry rate in industry i at time t 0.074 0.068 0 0.75
FDIit Foreign firm presence 0.16 0.229 0 1
HHIit Herfindahl index (concentration ratio) 0.318 0.266 0.005 1
Wageit Average wage per employee 38.925 353.038 0 17380.57
Laborit Total number of employees per industry 4973.22 9139.92 2 119861.5
Growthit Annual industry growth rate 0.015 0.372 -0.8 2.504
MESit Average firm size per industry 52.367 80.07 0.884 525.667
Capitalit Capital labor ratio 52092.94 388972.8 0 12400000
R&Dit Research and development intensity 7865.095 74124.96 0 1860314
Advertisementit Advertising intensity 8737.489 24222.53 0 347292
Ageit Average age of the workforce 38.925 353.038 20 54.344
Femaleit Proportion of female employees 0.247 0.149 0 0.806
Trainingit Training cost per employee 0.223 0.269 0 4.406
Skillit Skill composition of the workforce 0.295 0.136 0 1
Regionit Proportion of firms in certain regions 0.465 0.137 0 1
Note: Wage, Capital, R&D, Advertisement and Training are e 1000 per unit.
10 Details on this issue for the US are available at URL: goo.gl/SfuHTH (retrieved on 09/10/2013). More
information on EU competition law is available at URL: goo.gl/dGTaqW (retrieved on 09/10/2013).
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An examination of the Pearson correlation matrix in Table 2.2 suggests that pair-
wise correlations between independent variables used in equations (2.1) through (2.3)
are generally below .3 suggesting there is no multicollinearity problem. The two excep-
tions are the association between Training and FDI, and that between Advertisement
and R&D. The corresponding correlations are still below .5. Therefore, there are no
major concerns with regard to multicollinearity among the explanatory variables. Ta-
ble 2.2 also shows a negative correlation between FDI and Entry, and also between
Wage and Entry while Wage has a positive correlation with FDI. Furthermore, the
matrix implies a positive correlation between HHI and Entry as well as HHI and
FDI.
536891-L-sub01-bw-Marzieh
Processed on: 15-10-2019 PDF page: 51


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Processed on: 15-10-2019 PDF page: 52
34 Chapter 2
2.4 Empirical Results
Table 2.3 presents the estimation results. There are three panels corresponding to the
three equations (2.1) to (2.3). While Panel A displays the results for the entry equation
(equation 2.1), Panel B shows the results for the wage equation (equation 2.2). The
results from the concentration equation (equation 2.3) are reported in Panel C. In the
first model the contemporaneous level of FDI is included, while in second and third
column of Table 2.3 FDI is lagged one and two years, respectively.
To asses support for H1a and H2a, we begin with Panels C and B. As shown in
Panel C Model (1), the coefficient on foreign investment is significantly positive in-
dicating that higher FDI is associated with higher degrees of market concentration.
To be more precise, a 10% increase in FDI presence (measured as the share of foreign
employment in a given industry) coincides with an increase of about 1.1% in the con-
centration level. This finding is contrary to our expectation regarding sub-hypothesis
H1a. Nonetheless, using Greek manufacturing data, Bourlakis (1987) reports a sim-
ilar result. As demonstrated in Panel B Model (1), the estimated coefficient on FDI
is positive and significant at the 1% level suggesting that a larger foreign presence in
Dutch manufacturing coincides with higher average wages. A 10% increase in the for-
eign employment share corresponds to an increase of about 5.5% in the wage level in
the same industry. This finding is consistent with sub-hypothesis H2a. Driffield and
Girma (2003) report similar evidence in their study using UK electronic industries data.
The positive relationship between FDI on the one hand, and concentration and
wage levels on the other hand, refutes H1a and confirms H2a. In Model (1) of Panel A,
we show how these positive effects of FDI are translated into domestic entry rates. To
begin with, the coefficient of HHI is positive and significant at the 1% level in Panel
A. Specifically, a one-standard-deviation increase in industry concentration leads to an
approximately 1.7% increase in gross entry rates. This suggests that in Dutch manu-
facturing sectors higher concentration tends to create higher profits that stimulate the
entry of new and possibly more innovative or cost-efficient firms. Hence, H1b is partly
supported. Our results are in line with the findings of Kleijweg and Lever (1996), who,
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in their study of firm entry and exit in Dutch manufacturing industries, also report a
positive relationship between industry concentration and entry.
Table 2.3. 3SLS Results
Panel A
Entry Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
FDIit -.040*** (.011)
FDIit−1 -.032*** ( .011)
FDIit−2 -.031*** ( .011)
ln(Wage) -.036*** ( .009) -.038*** (.009) -.043*** (.009)
HHI .443*** ( .075) .449*** ( .075) .548*** ( .077)
ln(Growth) .022*** (.004) .020*** ( .004) .024*** (.005)
MES -.007*** ( .002) -.007*** ( .002) -.008*** (.003)
ln(Capital) .008*** ( .002) .008*** (.002) .011*** ( .002)
ln(R&D) .002* ( .001 ) .002* ( .001) .004*** ( .001)
ln(Advertisement) .015*** ( .003) .015*** ( .003) .017*** (.003)
Region .053*** ( .014) .056*** (.014) .039*** ( .015 )
Constant -.086** ( .040) -.091** (.040) -.066* ( .037)




FDIit−1 .423*** ( .053)
FDIit−2 .434*** ( .053)
MES -.152*** ( .015) -.146*** (.014) -.157*** (.015)
ln(Capital) .019*** (.005) .021*** (.005) .020*** (.005)
Age .029*** (.004) .027*** (.004) .028*** (.004)
Female -.596*** (.116) -.612*** (.117) -.542*** (.117)
Skill .215** (.089) .212** (.090) .216** (.091)
Training Cost .902*** (.046) .948*** (.046 ) .898*** (.045)
Region .011 (.080) .002 (.081) -.003 (.082)
Constant 1.336*** (.282) 1.508*** (.283) 1.263*** (.275)
R2 .547 .540 .543
Panel C
HHI
FDIit .109*** ( .020)
FDIit−1 .106*** ( .021)
FDIit−2 .083*** ( .022)
ln(Growth) -.010 (.010) -.006 ( .010) -.013 (.011)
MES .005*** (.006) .005*** ( .006) .005*** (.006)
ln(Capital) -.021*** (.002) -.021*** (.002) -.022*** ( .002)
ln(R&D) -.005** (.003) -.005** (.003) -.005* (.003)
ln(Advertisement) -.032*** (.003) -.032*** (.003) -.030*** (.003)
Region -.027 (.032) -.031 (.032) -.001 (.034)
Constant .672*** ( .066) 1.056*** (.084) .615*** (.069)
R2 .545 .111 .552
Obs. 3784 3782 3528
Total effect of FDI -.012 -.001 -.004
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, year and industry effects are included.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We now turn our attention to the effects of FDI-induced wage levels on gross entry
(i.e. sub-hypothesis H2b). An examination of Model (1) of Panel A shows that the
coefficient of ln(Wage) is negatively and significantly related to entry rates. As argued
in section 2.2, higher wage rates may encourage potential entrepreneurs to take up
jobs in established firms rather than starting their own firm, and thereby crowd-out
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domestic entrepreneurship. All else equal, a 10% increase in the wage level in an in-
dustry is associated with a reduction of 3.6% in gross entry rates. This suggests that
the availability of higher wages stemming from foreign presence is likely to pull indi-
viduals away from self-employment in Dutch manufacturing industries. Accordingly,
our analysis offers support for H2b.
Until now, the focus has been on the indirect effects of FDI on entry through con-
centration and wages. As shown in Panel A Model (1), FDI has a significant negative
direct effect on entry rates at the 1% confidence level. Contrary to our prediction in
H3, FDI is found to discourage domestic entrepreneurship after its indirect effects are
separated out. In the Dutch context, new firm entry tends to be more difficult when
industries are exposed to significant levels of foreign investment. Note that a 10% in-
crease in FDI reduces domestic entry by 0.4% which is nearly 6% of the average entry
rate. This is in line with the evidence provided by De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003)
for Belgium, and Goel (2018) in a cross-country framework. Table 2.D.1 in Appendix D
reports the economic significance of both FDI and channel effects on entry correspond-
ing Models (1) to (3) of Table 2.3.
In all three equations (panels A, B and C) in Model (1) of Table 2.3, we implicitly
assume that an increase in FDI11 presence in one year would have an effect on the de-
pendent variables in the same year. This simply assumes that all adjustments occur
within one year. However, it may take longer for gross entry to respond to FDI pres-
ence. To assess this, we incorporate the first and second lags of this variable separately
into each of the three equations (2.1) through (2.3). Estimation results from these al-
ternative specifications are presented in Models (2) and (3) in Table 2.3 respectively.
Using these specifications, our results are qualitatively similar to those with contem-
porary FDI. This establishes the existence of relatively long-run effects of FDI on gross
entry rates directly, and indirectly via wage and market concentration mechanisms.
11 Note that in this study we only consider FDI of firms with total assets of at least e 22.7M and entry rates
are predominantly measured through small firms with total assets below e 22.7M. This means that we only
investigate effects of FDI in larger firms on the entry of primarily small firms in order to solve the potential
endogeneity of the former.
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Finally, we calculate the total effect of FDI on entry by using the approach described
in Section 2.3.3. We take partial derivatives of equations (2.1) to (2.3) and substitute the
corresponding coefficients estimated from Table 2.3 in partial derivatives of the entry
equation. As shown in the last row of Table 2.3, the total effect of FDI on gross entry
rates is negative even after two years, however this effect becomes much smaller and
virtually vanishes after one year.
In Models (1) to (3) in Table 2.3, the control variables perform in line with our ex-
pectations with few exceptions. The signs and significance levels of the coefficients
on the control variables are overall consistent. This holds true for each of the three
equations that are estimated simultaneously. Regarding entry equations in Panel A,
the coefficients on industry growth are significantly positive at the 1% level indicating
that growing industries experience higher entry rates. Capital-labor ratio, advertising
intensity and R&D are also positively linked to entry at varying significance levels.
Furthermore, MES carries a significantly negative coefficient suggesting that a large
average firm size in an industry deters new firm formation. With respect to wage
equations in Panel B, we see that female employees earn, on average, less than their
male counterparts, a prediction that is well-supported empirically (Black and Brainerd
(2004)). The coefficients on Age, Skill and Training suggest that older, more skilled
and better trained employees receive higher wages. All these results are in accordance
with our expectations. Looking at the concentration equations in Panel C, a number of
control variables emerge as statistically significant. For instance, a higher minimum ef-
ficient scale (MES) coincides with increased industry concentration. In contrast, R&D
intensity diminishes the level of concentration, possibly by expanding the range of op-
portunities for new entry through knowledge generation.
2.5 Conclusions and Discussion
This chapter empirically examines the link between FDI and entry rates of new Dutch
firms in manufacturing industries at the 5-digit NACE level. As this association is
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multifaceted, we consider two channels transmitting FDI effects on entry: industry
concentration (H1a, H1b) and wage levels (H2a, H2b). We also evaluate whether FDI
is directly related to entry (H3) after these indirect effects are isolated.
First, we postulated that, in the Netherlands, increases in FDI correspond to reduc-
tions in the concentration level in the industry it targets (H1a), which subsequently
has a positive association with domestic entry in the same industry (H1b). Our re-
sults lead to the rejection of H1a, suggesting that industry concentration rises with
FDI. While this finding corroborates those reported by Bourlakis (1987) using Greek
manufacturing data, it contrasts with the results of Driffield (2001a) drawing on UK
manufacturing. Despite contradictory results, the research context of the latter is simi-
lar to our study in that we both focus on open economies. The fact that Driffield (2001a)
conducts the analysis with an older data set (1983-1992) and at a relatively aggregate
level (3-digit) might play a role in the conflicting findings. Thus, what explains the
positive link running from FDI to concentration? Blomström (1986) argues that one of
the main motivations behind entering foreign markets is to earn above-normal profits,
and thus foreign firms are predominantly attracted to concentrated industries offering
this possibility. Upon entry, foreign firms intensify concentration by further increasing
the minimum efficient scale which in turn inhibits new firm formation. While this in-
terpretation justifies the finding of H1a, it fails to illuminate why high concentration
is associated with higher entry rates. In a developed country, domestic firms, both
incumbents and entrants, are not sharply distinct from their foreign counterparts re-
garding technological and organizational capabilities (Caves (2007)). Our results sug-
gest that, upon the recognition of above-normal profit opportunities in concentrated
markets, new Dutch firms seem to easily circumvent entry barriers imposed by foreign
firms, for example, due to technological compatibility. Hence, H1b is partly confirmed.
Empirical support for this line of reasoning is reported by Kleijweg and Lever (1996)
where high concentration is found to attract more new firms to Dutch manufacturing
industries. Rosenbaum and Lamort (1992), and Jeong and Masson (1990) report simi-
lar results utilizing US and Korean data, respectively.
Our second hypothesis is that industries with larger FDI presence have higher
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wages (H2a) which eventually correspond to lower entrepreneurship rates in these
sectors (H2b). The rationale here is that wage premiums paid by foreign firms in com-
bination with positive wage spillovers to domestic firms culminate in higher average
wages at the industry level. Corroborative evidence is provided by Aitken et al. (1996)
for the US, and by Driffield and Girma (2003) for the UK. The availability of higher
wages, however, increases the opportunity cost of entry. Attracted by higher wages,
entrepreneurially-talented individuals may self-select into wage employment due to
uncertainty over potential income from business creation as shown in Parker (2004).
In their survey, van Praag and Versloot (2007) report that entrepreneurs have lower
median incomes that are more volatile and less secure than salaried jobs. Our analysis
supports both H2a and H2b that FDI puts upward pressure on wage levels which is
associated with lower gross entry rates in Dutch manufacturing industries.
Besides the two main hypotheses, our results suggest that the direct effect of FDI on
entrepreneurship is negative and statistically significant. The effect prevails both in the
short run and relatively long run, while its size diminishes over time. Thus, H3 does
not hold. In order to explore what mechanisms are involved in this outcome, we take
into account the heterogeneity of industries in terms of technological intensity. The
rationale for this lies in the conviction that an industry’s position on the technology
ladder may play a role in determining the size and direction of FDI effects. Our ex-
tended analysis (see Appendix C) demonstrates that once the sample is split into high-
tech and low-tech industries, the negatively significant effect on entrepreneurship is
preserved only in the low-tech subsample. It vanishes in the high-tech subsample and
even becomes positive (albeit insignificant). High-tech industries undertake extensive
efforts to achieve technological progress and innovation in products and processes.
The large capacity of these sectors in knowledge creation is (more) complementary
to foreign firms’ technological capabilities. Besides, the constant and quick renewal
of technology generates a wealth of new business opportunities. These salient fea-
tures may stimulate high-tech entrepreneurship and apparently counterbalance the
adverse effects of FDI on domestic entry, which is more pronounced in low-tech in-
dustries. This could indicate that the limited capacity in low-tech industries prevents
entrepreneurs from identifying, assimilating and converting new knowledge into up-
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and-coming businesses. Our finding for high- and low-tech industries is similar to the
finding of Barbosa and Eiriz (2009), who did not trace any significant effect for the
high-tech subsample.
Next to the industry breakdown, we have an alternative albeit tentative explana-
tion for the direct negative effect of FDI. Foreign and domestic firms compete in local
factor markets and the former may attract a sizable proportion of host country re-
sources (e.g., finance, physical capital) through leveraging their global scale (Navaretti
and Venables (2004)). This shift in the supply-demand balance of key resources tends
to raise the cost of new entry, putting domestic entrepreneurs at a disadvantage (Parker
(2009)). Large start-up costs may not only impede entry which otherwise would have
taken place at increased rates, but also erode expected future returns. Extended peri-
ods of time are often required to cover large entry costs, which may block the develop-
ment of enterprises and reduce the likelihood of their survival (van Stel et al. (2007)).
A large share of firms, however, fails in the early stages and few grow into large firms.
A would-be entrepreneur with a business idea may not proceed with its commercial-
ization if s/he perceives the success rate in generating revenues which offset initial
expenditures is low. Accordingly, we envisage that through interactions in factor mar-
kets, foreign firms may dampen incentives of prospective entrepreneurs to establish
new firms. Of course, this reasoning is suggestive and further empirical analysis is
required to examine its validity.
We show that the total effects of FDI on entry (channels plus direct) is negative.
This is in line with the evidence reported by De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003) using
Belgian manufacturing data, and by Danakol et al. (2017) and Goel (2018) who carry
out cross-country investigations. Nevertheless, our estimated effect is small and al-
most disappears after one year. Overall, our study shows that FDI can simultaneously
be a threat and an opportunity for new business creation in Dutch manufacturing in-
dustries.
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2.5.1 Implications for Theory
The combination of our findings complements and extends research on the intersec-
tion of new firm entry, entrepreneurship and host country effects of FDI. A review of
representative work points to the diversity and complexity of factors underlying the
influence of FDI on entry, yet empirical verification of these claims within an integra-
tive framework is absent. As such, while there is agreement that industry concentra-
tion and wages are two fundamental channels through which FDI may affect new firm
entry, the examination of how they vary in their effects merits a deeper analysis to as-
certain their relative importance. Our results enrich the literature by quantifying and
comparing these channels’ effects on entry which work in opposite directions. This
is of theoretical interest as well, as the trade-off of between concentration and wages
implies the need for their joint consideration in future FDI studies. We also challenge
the premise that high concentration acts as entry deterrent. This result is salient in
light of the overwhelming contrary evidence; and the analysis of whether high-profits,
as we conjecture, or an alternative rationale explains this finding offers opportunities
for theory building in the firm entry and entrepreneurship literature. Furthermore,
the fact that a negative effect on entry persists after the indirect effects are removed
clearly indicates the presence of other coexisting factors. We envision some factors
hinder entry, some help and some make no difference. For example, by drawing on
the entrepreneurial ecosystem perspective, Bhawe and Zahra (2017) highlight the role
of absorptive capacity in the way local entrepreneurship responds to rising FDI. Our
study contributes to the theory by suggesting that the neglect of essential factors can
result in biased assessments of the effects of FDI on firm entry. In order to attain a co-
herent and integrated representation of actual relationships, one needs to address this
concern.
2.5.2 Policy Implications
Our analysis also has policy implications. First, although high market concentration is
a legitimate concern due to the potential abuse of market power against new entrants,
such a conclusion is not justified in Dutch manufacturing sectors. Lucrative rents in
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markets seem to be accessible to both foreign and domestic firms, conceivably due
to effective enforcement of policy arrangements on collusive and retaliatory conducts
of incumbent firms, as well as technological proximity. Although there is no imme-
diate threat of increased concentration, policy makers can perform in-depth industry
analyses to identify specific causes of this market distortion. For instance, heightened
concentration in the industry may be the result of large scale foreign entry. Alterna-
tively, heavy R&D investment by foreign firms may give rise to the accumulation of
market shares amongst a small number of enterprises. Besides, market conditions in
certain industries may change more rapidly or slowly depending, for example, on the
rate of the obsolescence of technology. A rapid renewal of technology, in turn, results
in short product cycles where foreign firms can be more adept at reversing the market
concentration in their favor. As a result, due to the various causes of market con-
centration surrounding FDI, any policy response correcting anti-competitive behavior
should place greater emphasis on specific industry settings, and should be formulated
accordingly.
Second, policy makers may develop strategies to curb the negative effects of FDI
on entrepreneurship conveyed through the wage channel. Yet, from a welfare point
of view, an effective policy design should not necessarily equate the selection of en-
trepreneurial talent into wage-employment to being undesirable. Under certain cir-
cumstances, the added welfare of employment filled with innovative and creative
practices may be comparable to, or even larger than that arising from new firm activ-
ity, given the persistent high failure rates of start-ups. For instance, if a motivated en-
trepreneur takes a position in a technologically strong foreign firm offering good remu-
neration and promotion prospects, this move may generate welfare-enhancing oppor-
tunities through intrapreneurship. Therefore, policy-making may be directed towards
increasing the awareness on the importance of intrapreneurship among private sector
actors, especially among large businesses that are capable of devoting more resources
to innovation. Hence, an effective government policy supporting entrepreneurial ac-
tivities within existing businesses may, to some degree, counterbalance the reduced
entrepreneurship rates stemming from high wages.
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2.5.3 Limitations
The results of this study should be interpreted in the context of potential limitations.
First, the presence of foreign firms is likely to be endogenous, while our empirical
approach treats FDI as a predetermined variable. Although we control for the most
common observed (and unobserved) factors that the literature identifies to explain
wages and competition, and in addition we use 3SLS which allows disturbances to be
correlated across equations, we cannot completely rule out that endogeneity of FDI af-
fects our results. For instance, it is conceivable that foreign investors ‘cherry pick’ the
best performing target firms, which, for example, already employ high-quality labor
and pay higher wages than the average domestic firm. Neglecting this ‘cherry pick-
ing’ implies that the extent of wage premiums offered by foreign-owned enterprises
may be overestimated.12 We expect the omitted variable bias to be small, as wages are
measured at the industry level, and the FDI share is on average 16%, and therefore
the wage premium will be relatively small. Furthermore, we show the robustness of
our results using lags of FDI to avoid simultaneity bias to affect our results. To com-
pletely rule out remaining concerns related to the endogeneity of FDI, one needs a
(quasi-)natural experiment, which is however not at our disposal; this is left for future
research.
The second limitation is that the FDI variable used in this study only applies to
companies with total assets of at least e 22.7M. Fortunately, the vast majority of FDI
takes place through companies of this size. Moreover, we weighted FDI with a firm’s
foreign equity participation divided by its size to avoid possible aggregation bias.
Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that the FDI effects on new business cre-
ation reported in this work pertain to foreign investments in relatively large compa-
nies.
12 A few studies (e.g. Almeida (2007); Heyman et al. (2007)) use matched employer-employee data to address
this issue. The results in both papers show that higher wage premiums in foreign firms, although existent,
are lower than previously thought. The data in this study, however, does not allow for such a matching
procedure.
536891-L-sub01-bw-Marzieh
Processed on: 15-10-2019 PDF page: 62
44 Chapter 2
2.5.4 Future Research
Developing countries are becoming increasingly important as both recipients and sources
of FDI inflows. Due to the recent economic crisis, FDI to advanced economies fluc-
tuates with a downward trend, and the attractiveness of developing countries is in-
creased as investment destinations. Consequently, it comes as no surprise that in 2012,
the share of world FDI inflows to these countries exceeded inflows to developed na-
tions. Given that overall industry structure and labor markets manifest sharp differ-
ences across developing and developed countries with the former enjoying a boom
in FDI inflows, it would be interesting to replicate the present study in a developing
country context.
Second, a future research opportunity is envisioned in relation to taking the hetero-
geneity in FDI source countries into account. Specifically, the current study depicts the
North-North case with regard to the direction of FDI as the lion’s share of inflows into
the Netherlands originates from advanced countries. In contrast, developing countries
attract foreign investment both from advanced and developing economies, meaning
that South-South FDI inflows have recently grown in importance. For instance, China
receives sizable FDI from Asia’s newly developing countries. Likewise, China and
South Africa are now major investors in Africa. Chinese FDI in Latin America shows
much faster growth than global FDI in the region. Hence, a comparative study may
be conducted to find out whether FDI from advanced countries has different effects on
entrepreneurship through concentration and wage channels than FDI from develop-
ing countries. If the host country is a developing one, we should expect technological
proximity to be high with the latter group and low with the former, which may deter-
mine the scope of the effects of FDI.
Furthermore, the role of Greenfield versus M&A investment is important. The ef-
fects of these types of investment may be very different. Greenfield investment al-
ways involves new activities and thus might increase competition, M&A investment
involves acquiring existing activities or firms and is more likely to decrease compe-
tition. Therefore, the distinction between greenfield and M&A can be interesting for
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future research. Additionally, when technology gaps are too large, firms with weaker
technological capabilities cannot absorb advanced technologies and knowledge flows
will not take place (Abramovitz (1989)). Thus, the role of the technology gap can be
an avenue for future research. Finally, competition, concentration and dispersion may
take place at the European level. Therefore, broadening the data to a European wide
panel would also be an interesting option for future research.
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2.A Concentration-Competition Link
The association between market concentration and competition is well-grounded in
industrial organization theory (see Tirole (1988)) and particularly in the structure-
conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm introduced by Bain (1968). The SCP paradigm
suggests that industries characterized by low concentration constrain the conduct of
firms with respect to pricing and advertising policies, innovation, etc. Firms comply
with the prevailing prices and earn normal profits in the long run. In contrast, a higher
level of concentration provides them more freedom in market conduct choices, and is
assumed to facilitate collusive activities and anti-competitive practices. High concen-
tration is then taken as an indication of weak competition resulting in high prices and
high price-cost margins. Put differently, there is an inverse relationship between the
degree of industry concentration and competition (Scherer and Ross (1990)).
Since the introduction of the SCP paradigm, numerous empirical studies have re-
sorted to the indicators of concentration to proxy competition, notably the Herfindahl
index (see Valta (2012); Xu (2012); Amess and Roberts (2005)). If a declining trend is
detected in the index over time, this is reflective of that particular industry becoming
more competitive. Following previous studies, we use the Herfindahl index as our
proxy for competition. In the literature, alternative measures of competition are also
offered, for instance, by Boone (2008), and these measures are compared in their ability
to reflect changes in competition (Boone et al. (2007)). Nonetheless, with the data we
had access to, the Herfindahl index was the most appropriate choice for this study.
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2.B Data
Table 2.B.1. Variables: Descriptions and Data Sources
VARIABLES DESCRIPTION DATA SOURCE
Entry Number of domestic firm entries at time t divided by the total Business Register
number of firms in the same period in industry i
FDI Number of employees in foreign firms weighted by the firm’s foreign SFGO
equity participation divided by total employment in industry i at time t
HHI The sum of squares of market shares of all firms in industry i at time t Production Statistics
Wage Logarithm of the total industry wage bill divided by total employment Production Statistics
in industry i at time t
Labor Logarithm of the total number of employees in industry i at time t Business Register
Growth Industry annual employment growth rate Business Register
MES Average firm size, defined as total employment in industry Business Register
i divided by the total number of firms in the same industry at time t
Capital Industry capital stock divided by total employment in industry i at time t SFGO, SFKO,
Business Register
R&D Total R&D expenditures divided by total sales in industry i at time t Production Statistics
Advertisement Total advertising expenditures divided by total sales in industry i at time t Production Statistics
Age Average age of the workforce in industry i at time t GBA
Female Proportion of female employees in industry i at time t GBA
Training Total training costs divided by total employment in industry i at time t Production Statistics,
Business Register
Skill Proportion of highly-skilled employees who have a college education in Educational Level
industry i at time t.
Region Proportion of firms in industry i at time t that are located in the regions Business Register
North Holland, South Holland and North Brabant.
Note: International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) forms the basis for the variable Skill. Employees
with educational level 5 or 6 based on ISCED codes are considered as highly-skilled. Programs classified at level 5
include, for example: (higher) technical education, community college education, technician or advanced/higher
vocational training, associate degree. Likewise, programs classified at level 6 cover, for example:
bachelor’s programs, license or first university cycle.
2.C Robustness Analyses
2.C.1 Excluding One-(wo)man Firms
To check the robustness of our findings, we estimated our system of equations by us-
ing different subsamples. First, we define a sample excluding one-(wo)man firms (i.e.
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ZZPs).13 This sample is an unbalanced panel of 3782 industry-year observations.
One-(wo)man businesses operate under special regulatory and tax conditions in
the Netherlands.14 Since they account for almost 15% of all firms and half of the new
firm entries per year and over the sample period in our data set, it is worthwhile to
check whether previously discussed results are sensitive to the exclusion of these firms.
Estimates derived from this subsample are displayed in Models (1) through (3) of Table
2.C.1 in the same way as before.15 A quick look at these alternative models suggests
that the results are by and large in agreement with those obtained from the analysis of
the whole sample.
2.C.2 High vs. Low Technology Industries
The above analysis assumes homogeneity of manufacturing industries. However, in-
dustries with different underlying structures may have particular sensitivities to FDI.
Due to the differences in, for example, the degree of innovation capacity, or the sources
and directions of technical change, the effects of FDI on firm entry may not be uni-
formly distributed across industries. This predominantly applies to the differentiation
between high- and low-tech sectors. In addition, Table 2.3 shows that there is a signifi-
cantly positive effect of R&D intensity on entrepreneurship, suggesting a possible role
of technological competencies of different industries. Therefore, it would be worth-
while to test developed hypotheses in section 2 considering technology advantages
of firms. Thus, similar to Barbosa and Eiriz (2009) we replicate our analysis sepa-
13 ZZPs (zelfstandige zonder personeel in Dutch, i.e. independent professional without personnel) are those
people who work for themselves but do not hire any other employees.
14 The Dutch tax regime has been structured in such a way that there are large financial benefits for freelanc-
ing: one often has to pay no taxes at all in the first few years. As a result, many people have opted to start
one-(wo)man businesses and become a ZZP-er.
15 Industries in our data set are very narrowly defined: at the 5-digit level. Two of our 252 industries (in a
given year) consist of only one-(wo)man firms. Therefore, when these firms are excluded in the robustness
checks, these two industries drop out of our sample. The original sample size is then reduced by two
observations from 3784 to 3782 in the robustness analysis. In contrast, the remaining 250 industries consist
of both one-(wo)man and other firms and we can still compute all of our industry-level variables in a similar
way as before. This means that all of these 250 industries remain in the sample used in the robustness
analysis.
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Table 2.C.1. 3SLS Results
Sample excludes one-(wo)man businesses
Panel A
Entry Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
FDIit -.034*** ( .011)
FDIit−1 -.027** ( .011 )
FDIit−2 -.029*** ( .010)
ln(Wage) -.032*** ( .008) -.034*** ( .008 ) -.041*** ( .009)
HHI .357*** (.076) .362*** ( .075) .489*** ( .075)
ln(Growth) .021*** ( .004) .019*** ( .004 ) .023*** ( .005)
MES -.005*** ( .002) -.006*** (.002) -.007*** ( .002)
ln(Capital) .006*** ( .002 ) .006*** ( .002 ) .010*** ( .002)
ln(R&D) .0014 (.001) .001 (.001) .003 (.001)
ln(Advertisement) .013*** ( .004) .013*** (.004) .015*** ( .003)
Region .058*** (.013) .060*** ( .013) .045*** (.013)
Constant -.0609 ( .040) -.114 ( .075) -.121 (.063)
R2 0.308 0.296 0.10
Panel B
ln(Wage)
FDIit .546*** ( .053)
FDIit−1 .411*** ( .054)
FDIit−2 .419*** ( .054)
MES -.132*** ( .013 ) -.127*** ( .013) -.135*** ( .014)
ln(Capital) .020*** ( .005) .022*** ( .005) .021*** (.005)
Age .029*** (.004) .028*** (.004) .031*** ( .004)
Female -.702*** (.118) -.725*** (.120) -.646*** (.120)
Skill .184** (.091) .182** (.092) .184** (.094)
Training Cost .919*** ( .047) .966*** (.047) .911*** (.046)
Region -.055 (.076) -.065 ( .078) -.048 (.079)
Constant 1.285*** (.288) 1.461*** (.289) 1.340*** (.283)
R2 .547 .539 .542
Panel C
HHI
FDIit .112*** ( .020)
FDIit−1 .108*** ( .021)
FDIit−2 .086*** ( .022)
ln(Growth) -.008 (.010) -.004 (.010) -.010 (.011)
MES .005*** (.005) .005*** ( .005) .005*** (.005)
ln(Capital) -.020*** ( .002) -.020*** (.002) -.021*** ( .002)
ln(R&D) -.005* (.003) -.005* (.003) -.005 (.003)
ln(Advertisement) -.033*** ( .003) -.033*** (.003) -.032*** ( .003)
Region -.044 (.030) -.048 (.030) -.017 ( .032)
Constant 1.039*** (.083) .704*** (.066) 1.032*** ( .092)
R2 .547 .545 .554
Obs. 3782 3780 3526
Total effect of FDI -.012 -.002 -.004
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, year and industry effects are included.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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rately using subsamples of high- and low-tech Dutch manufacturing industries. The
breakdown according to technological intensity is based on NACE Rev. 1.1. which is
provided by Eurostat.16 High-tech group covers the codes 24, 29-35 (except for 35.1)
and low-tech group covers 15-23, 25-28, 35.1, 36 and 37. Appendix E displays the list
of industries assigned to each subsample in detail.
The estimation results are presented in Table 2.C.2 for both the whole sample and
the sample excluding one-wo(man) businesses. Comparing the results, we find strik-
ing differences in the way FDI affects gross entry. Specifically, the negative direct effect
of FDI only prevails in the low-tech group, and it disappears in the high-tech sector. To
illustrate, a 10% increase in FDI measured as the share of foreign employment reduces
gross entry rates in low-tech sectors by 0.71% and 0.64% in the samples including and
excluding one-(wo)man businesses, respectively. This suggests that domestic inno-
vative and absorptive capacity in knowledge intensive industries is (more) comple-
mentary to new technologies and know-how of foreign firms. This complementarity
may provide sufficient incentives for entrepreneurs to enter high-tech industries and
seemingly compensate for the negative consequences of FDI which is found to be more
applicable to low-tech industries. Our finding for high- and low-tech industries is sim-
ilar to the finding of Barbosa and Eiriz (2009), who did not trace any significant effect
of FDI on firm entry for the high-tech subsample.
16 Eurostat uses the following aggregation of manufacturing industries according to technological intensity:
high-technology, medium high-technology, medium low-technology and low-technology. We combine the
first two categories and label it as high-tech, and subsequently merger the last two categories and label it as
low-tech.
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Table 2.C.2. High-technology vs. Low-technology
Full sample Sample excludes one-(wo)man businesses
Panel A
Entry High-tech Low-tech High-tech Low-tech
FDI .021 ( .016) -.071***(.016) .021(.016) -.064*** (.016)
ln(Wage) -.045*** ( .017) -.028***(.010) -.040** (.017) -.026*** (.010)
HHI .200*( .108) .576*** ( .093) .156 (.109) .498***(.097)
ln(Growth) .023*** ( .005) .025*** ( .006) .023*** ( .005) .023*** (.006)
MES 0.001 (.004) -.009*** (.0031) -.001 (.003) -.007*** (.003)
ln(Capital) .0005 (.002) .014*** (.003) .001 (.002) .012*** ( .003)
ln(R&D) .004*** (.001) .003* ( .002) .003** (.001) .002 (.002)
ln(Advertisement) .003 (.007) .019*** ( .004) .002 ( .007) .017*** (.004)
Region .050 (.046) .046*** (.016) .040 (.041) .057*** (.015)
Constant 0 -.239*** ( .066) .123* (.066) -.199*** (.068)
R2 0.6021 0.5695 0.6887 0.6119
Panel B
ln(Wage)
FDI .438*** ( 0.086) .578*** (.063) .434*** (.088) .573*** ( .064)
MES -.102*** ( 0.021) -.166*** (.018) -.092*** (.019 ) -.143*** ( .016 )
ln(Capital) .005 (.007) .020*** (.006) .007 (.007) .020*** (.006)
Age .049*** (.008) .025*** ( .005) .047*** ( .009) .026*** ( .005)
Female -.685*** (.240) -.675*** ( .135) -.894*** ( .250) -.759*** (.138)
Skill .620*** (.154) .093 (.107) .649*** (.159) .048 (.110)
Training 1.262*** ( .075) .816*** ( .056) 1.288*** (.076) .833*** ( .057)
Region .132 ( .150) -.013 ( .094) -.028 (.138) -.073 (.090)
Constant .124 ( .375) 1.555*** (.317) .291 (.393) 1.468*** ( .322)
R2 .635 .529 .632 .529
Panel C
HHI
FDI .129*** ( .048) .121*** ( .023) .128*** ( .048) .124*** (.023)
ln(Growth) .017 ( .019) -.019 ( .012) .018 (.019) -.016 (.012)
MES .005*** ( .001) .005*** ( .007) .004*** (.001) .004*** (.006)
ln(Capital) .004 ( .004) -.028*** (.003) .005 ( .005) -.027*** (.003)
ln(R&D) -.0002733 ( .005) -.008** ( .003) -.0001 ( .005) -.007** ( .003)
ln(Advertisement) -.051*** ( .007) -.028*** (.004) -.051*** (.007) -.030*** ( .003)
Region -.241*** ( .080) .001(.035) -.245*** (.071) -.016 (.033)
Constant .871*** ( .082) .664*** (.067) .855*** (.078) 1.028*** ( .084)
R2 .448 .582 .448 .583
Obs 1048 2736 1042 2736
Total effect of FDI .027 -.018 .024 -.017
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, year and industry effects are included.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
HHI almost has no effect on entry in high-tech while its coefficient has a significant
positive sign in low-tech, suggesting that higher concentration stimulates entry only
into the latter group. Wages are negatively linked to gross entry rates in both subsam-
ples, which is in line with our main results. Finally, Table 2.C.2 also shows that while
the total FDI effect is positive for high-tech industries, it is negative for low-tech ones.
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2.D Economic Significance
Here, we discuss the economic significance of our estimates. Table 2.D.1 displays the
size effects of a subset of the models included in Tables 2.3 and 2.C.1. The economic
effects are calculated as the percentage change in the dependent variable with respect
to a 10% increase in the relevant independent variable. Values in columns (1) to (3)
are based on Models (1) to (3) in Table 2.3 drawing on the whole sample. Columns
(4) to (6) correspond to the economic effects of the results presented in Table 2.C.1, the
estimation for robustness check. We see that a 10% increase in FDI coincides with an
increase in market concentration of 1.1%. The effect of FDI on wages is economically
larger. A 10% increase in FDI is associated with an increase of 5.5% in industry wages.
The channel effects of concentration and wages on entry are both smaller. A 10% in-
crease in industry wages translates into a decrease of 3.6% in gross entry rates. For
market concentration, an increase of 10% translates into an increase of 4.43% in entry
rates. A similar picture emerges in the subsequent columns (3) to (6). In summary, the
economic effects of FDI on wages are the largest among the relationships depicted in
Table 2.D.1. The effects of wages on entry are a bit smaller, which slightly diminishes
the power of this channel. Additionally, these reduced effects of wages on gross entry
rates are neutralized by the counter-effect of the second channel, market concentration.
In other words, although the indirect effect of FDI on entry through the wage channel
might initially appear troublesome, the effect: i) is weakened on its way through the
channel, and ii) is offset by the counter effects between FDI, market concentration and
entry rate.
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Table 2.D.1. Economic Significance
Full sample Sample excludes one-(wo)man businesses
Panel A




ln(Wage) -3.6 -3.8 -4.3 -3.2 -3.4 -4.1











Note: Economic significance is calculated as the percentage change in the dependent variable with
respect to a 10% increase in the relevant independent variable.
2.E Dutch Manufacturing
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Table 2.E.1. Manufacturing Industries According to Technological Intensity
HIGH-TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES NACE 2-digit industry code
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical product 24
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c* 29
Manufacture of office machinery and computers 30
Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c* 31
Manufacture of radio, television and communication
equipment and apparatus 32
Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments,
watches and clocks 33
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 34
Manufacture of other transport equipment
(excluding building and repairing of ships and boats) 35 (excluding 35.1)
LOW-TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES
Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco;
textiles and textile products; leather and leather products;
wood and wood products; pulp, paper and paper products,
publishing and printing 15 to 22
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 23
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products;
basic metals and fabricated metal products;
other non-metallic mineral products 25 to 28
Building and repairing of ships and boats 35.1
Manufacturing n.e.c. 36 to 37
* n.e.c. means not elsewhere classified. This class consists of units mainly engaged in manufacturing
machinery and equipment or parts for such equipment not elsewhere classified.
Source: Eurostat
